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Scholarship Fund Nearly Quadrupled

I

i

Scholarship applicants can have sharply higher hopes of
receiving aid this year, according to a recent release from
the dean's office.
"Our available funds have nearly quadrupled over last
year's," Dean Stephen R . Curtis stated, "and there is
strong evidence that we may have even more untapped
sources ."
The largest single group of contributors, the dean reported, is law firms within the Twin City area. Corporations
have also made substantial contributions.
"Our solicitations have only just begun," he said. "The
response has been most encouraging." "Many attorneys in-

dicated that they had not considered contributions to William Mitchell, only because no one had ever suggested it.
We were happy to find that they have a strong interest in
the progress of our school."
A widely held false conception, according to the dean, is
that students at evening law schools have no need of scholarship aid. "While it is true that most of our students hold
down full-time jobs, it is also true that a great majority of
them are supporting families. For some of these, the cost
of a legal education is almost prohibitive." The dean found
a high interest in the students' situation among most attorneys, once they were apprised of the facts.
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The awards will be announced during November or December, depending upon when all contributors have informed the college of their intended gifts. A faculty committee will name the recipients, basing their decisions on
both academic achievement and financial need. Most funds
are contributed without restriction as to recipients, giving
the committee full discretion in its choices.
Among the awards from new sources this year are two
from women's groups interested in the college. The William
Mitchell Law Wives have announced a $300 tuition award,
and the Ramsey County Lawyers' Wives Guild has resolved
to make a contribution.
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Orientation
Nights Held
For Freshmen

No. 1

Judge John B. Sanborn Portrait
·Hangs In School's Front Foyer

The freshman class this year
participated in William Mitchell's
first orientation program.
The sessions were held Thursday
and Friday in the week before classes
started.
The students were welcomed by
Dean Curtis. He talked to them
about the history and operations of
the school and the responsibilities
of the students.
Mr. Danforth talked to the students about the adversary system,
systems of courts and the conduct
of William Mitchell's Moot Court.
Mr. Montague discussed the
sources and forms of law, how to
study law, the use of the case method and briefing cases.
Mr. Green talked to the students
about the place of law in society,
the importance of language in the
work of the law students and lawyers and the content and use of
the library.
Mr. Dulebohn explained some of
the work the lawyer does, his office
work and litigation.
Milton Bix, President of the Student Bar Association, talked to the
group about the Student Bar Associ- Presenting the portrait of the Honorable John B. Sanborn to Dean Stephan R.
ation. Dr. Raymond B. Vander Curtis and the William Mitchell College of Law is Mr. Lee H. Slater.
Borght talked on our Common Law
in the world.

By John E. McKendriek

One of the new additions to the physical plant of the William Mitchell
College of Law during the past year is the portrait of the Honorable
John B. Sanborn, which now hangs on the wall opposite the front foyer
of the building.
The portrait first appeared last summer at the commencement exercises in June, where it was presented to William Mitchell by Lee H.
Slater, President of the West Publishing Co. Reportedly, the finished
painting was partially the product of much diligence on the part of
Mr. Slater and Dean Curtis, whose task it was to convince Judge Sanborn that being photographed for the portrait was in the interest of
propriety.
Considering Judge Sanborn's long association with William
Mitchell College of Law, the presence of his portrait is deemed
to be most appropriate. From the time of the merger in 1956,
Judge Sanborn was a trustee and vice president until 1959.

Formerly, during the period from 1935 to 1956, he was a .trustee and
eventually the president of the St. Paul College of Law, which with the
Minneapolis-Minnesota College of Law, was the forerunner of the William Mitchell College of Law.
Judge Sanborn is also an alumnus of the St. Paul College of Law,
where he received his LL.B . in 1907. Born in St. Paul on Nov. 9, 1883, he
has lived in the state all of his life.
After admittance to the Minnesota bar in 1907, Judge Sanborn practiced law until 1922. During this time, he served for a few years in the
Minnesota House of Representatives and later became Commissioner of
Insurance and a member o_f the Minnesota Tax Commission.

In 1922, Judge Sanborn was appointed as judge of the District Court
for Ramsey County, where he remained until 1925. He then became
a United States district judge for Minnesota and, in 1982, he was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

REVISE MODEL PENAL CODE AND MINNESOTA'S PROPOSED PENAL CODE

Law Institute Approves Model Penal Code
By Russell L. Streefland

The American Law Institute on May 24, 196.i, gave final approval
to a Model Penal Code that has been under preparation for 10 years.
The new code encompasses an exhaustive study of the philosophical and
p. cholo.g ital ba es of the criminal law. More important probably than
any .sin"le provision of the code is its over-all approach . It trie to
bring a unified and logical. approach to cciminal law, which ha grown
up in the variou tates b cattered and often inconsistent laws over
the vears.
To correct the conspicuous variations in' sentencing that sometimes
give justice an uneven look, the model code provide three degrees of
felony for sentencing purposes. Definitions of particular crimes are carefully drawn. Disorderly conduct, for example, which now can constitute
almost anything the state dislikes, is narrowly defined.
More than 100 pages are devoted in the code to such general
questions as when the defense of double jeopardy should be avail·
able, when it is permissible to use force in defense of person or
property, and when a man is mentally responsible for conunis•
sion of a crime.

The code's definition of criminal incapacity by reason of insanity
has already won wide approval. It provides that a person is not responsible for a crime if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
it to the law.
The code takes no position on the question of capital punishment, but
it does suggest a new procedure for imposing sentence in the states
which retain the death penalty. The jury would first bring in a verdict
as to guilt and then in a separate proceeding decide whether there should

Since his "official" retirement two
years ago, Judge Sanborn has remained at his post under the title
of senior judge and still retains a
full workload.

be a death sentence. Unless the jury unanimously agreed, the judge
could not impose the death penalty.

THE MINNESOTA CODE

Roland J. Faricy,
'22 Dies

A re-examination of the criminal law was recently completed in
Sad news has been received of
Minnesota,' when the Advisory Committee on Recodification of the Crimithe
sudden death on November 16,
nal Code of Minnesota released a 579-page report proposing revisions
to the Minnesota Criminal Code. This report will be submitted to the of Roland J. Faricy, '22. He prac1963 session of the Minnesota legislature.
ticed law in St.
The core of the present Minnesota Criminal Code was adopted in
Paul for forty years,
1885 and has not since undergone serious revision. The proposed code
after graduation
presents a sweeping modernization of the criminal law, with special emfrom the St. Paul
phasis on rehabilitation and restoration of convicted felons to citizenCollege of Law. He
ship and de mphasis on the aspects of punishment. 1
·
For exam.pie, under the new code pre.5entence investigations
was a member of
would be mandatory after all felony convictions. They are now
the firm of Faricy,
. optional.
Moore,
Costello and
Diagnostic studies would be required of convicted criminals by the
State Commissioner of Corrections in cases where the crime carries a Roland J. Faricy Hart and a member
maximum sentence of 10 years or more, and in cases where the "habitual
of the corporation of
offender" statute is invoked. These studies would be available to the de- the William Mitchell College of Law.
fense attorney.
He rendered valuable services to
Serving on the 22-man Advisory Committee are Prof. Maynard Pirsig,
this school through the years and
Associate Justice William Murphy and Chief Justice Oscar R. Knutson
of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Justice Murphy is an alumnus of Wil- only a few months ago participated
liam Mitchell, and Chief Justice Knutson is a member of William Mitch 0 through his firm in our scholarship .
ell's Committee on Professional Responsibility.
program.
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THE STUDENTS SPEAK:

Law Student's Role

By Milton Bix

I had the opportunity to attend
the 14th annual meeting of the
As members of the Student Bar,
American Law Student Association you have available the ALSA Life
held this year in San Francisco, Insurance and the opportunity to
Calif.
subscribe to the ABA Journal at a
nominal fee. You also have availThe purpose of the ALSA Annual able the services of an outstanding
Meeting is to bring together the placement bureau . As members of
presidents and delegates of the 131 the Student Bar you have, in addiaccredited law schools in the United
tion, the opportunity to read a naStates (representing 40,000 law stutional award winning publication,
dents) to discuss the Student Bar
the William Mitchell Opinion.
Association and its responsibility to
It is unfortunate that students
the student, the school, and the legal
fail
to take an active role in the
profession.
Student Bar Association. Students
Legal seminars and workshops
say they lack the
were conducted by members of the
time to be active in
extra-curricular acAmerican Bar Association. The leetivities at a night
tures and demonstrations dealt with
school. I cannot bemany phases of the legal profession,
lieve
this. Our smokbut the main focal point always
er in September atconcerned itself with the law and
tracted more then
its role in society.
~00 students, and
This article will deal primarily
Milton Bix
fraternity memberwith two subjects: the individual ship is climbing. The time is there-membership program initiated this it is the desire that is lacking.

Our society is an extremely complex structure. The LAW is the
cement that holds this complexity together much in the way that cement
holds a brick building together. If the holding cement is improperly mixed
or improperly applied the entire building collapses, if indeed it rises
at all.
We can reason, therefore, that untrained workers should not undertake either to mix or apply the cement. Only those workers thoroughly year by the ALSA and the role of
trained have the knowledge and skill necessary to ensure that the build- the Student Bar Association in a
ing holds together.
law school. It is the purpose of the
ALSA to better educate the stuWhen this theory is related directly to our society, we see that
dents with the primary purposes of
it is the student of law who is endeavoring to learn the mixing
and application processes necessary to society's "holding
the Student Bar program .
strength." Without the lawyer, the mixing and application could
never occur. Without this, society would collapse.

With this in mind, we as law students should see our goal clearly.
We must recognize the true value of the opportunity that is before us
and be thankful for it. We must feel the necessity of the law as an intricate and vital aspect of our society. To attempt the study of law
without realizing the full meaning of its importance to our life would
be a meaningless task.
Above all, we must remember that the student of law is the worker
who is seeking to acquire the necessary knowledge and skill with which
to mix and apply the "cement" of society. His goal-our goal-is the
preservation of a way of life.
-Douglas Wayne Snyder

Support Student Bar
The purpose of the Student Bar Association at William Mitchell is
to promote scholastic achievement among the students, develop understanding among the faculty and students, and further the professional
and social interests of the students. These goals can be accomplished only
through a coordinated effort between the governing board and the students. It is my desire that this year the Student Bar can achieve new
goals in providing the students the services that are needed.
Our "smoker" in September was a tremendous success. More than
200 students showed up at the University Club to meet their friends and
get acquainted with members of the faculty.

Student Bar Movement
It is a difficult task to prepare
students for the legal profession .
The process of preparing law students for the organized legal profession is the essence of what is termed
the " Student Bar Movement." Although not licensed practioners,
law students are members of the
legal profession and must share its
exacting responsibilities. The mel.!,ns
by which the student participates
in the legal profession is his Student
Bar Association and the American
Law Student Association.
The Student Bar 1nove1nent
must concentrate on the area
outside the classroo1n-selfdevelopment of the law students, organization activities
to supplement the:r formal
education, and responsibility to
their school. Thus, the Student
Bar at William Mitchell must
encourage development
by
each student as he prepares to
take his place in society as a

If any student is finding it difficult to obtain employment, he
should talk to William Mortensen, Chairman of the Placement
Bureau. He may be able to help you.

Martin Conway, chairman of the Welfare and Curricula Committee,
1s looking into the possibility of adding new machines to our lounge,
thereby giving the students a better selection of foodstuffs.

a member of the legal profession.

Frosh 131 Strong
Begin Studies

The American Law Student Association and the local Student Bar
can only provide the means by
which the individual student can
prepare himself for the legal pro-

fession; it cannot assume the responsibility that each student must
assume himself.

Individual Program
At this year's annuai m€eting, the
final touches on the Individual
Membership Program were present, d. The establishment of ALSA's
program is undoubtedly the most
significant development in the organization's 13-year history. Now
law students can voluntarily become
members of a national legal organization while still in law school.
The Individual Membership Program of the ALSA has several major
purposes, the prime one being to
acquaint law students with the importance and value of organized Bar
participation. Another major purpose is to aid in the strengthening
of local Student Bar programs, it
being necessary for a law student to
be a member of his local Student
Bar Association before he can be
eligible for ALSA membership.
A third purpose also exists - to
provide a convenient and effective
means for providing needed services
to law students in their pre-professional years. It is axiomatic that
there be efficiency and economy, as
,Yell as strength, in numbers.

Dicta By the Dean

1

Changes in faculty seem endless and so do their causes. During 1962 we have lost Marshman Wattson and Jeanette Bluhm
from the full-time faculty, .. farsh through death and J eanettethr ugh illne : and part- time in t ructor s Hon. Dougla A mdahl,
horn the pres ure of other re poi ibilitie and Charle G01·do11,
from his promotion to become A sistant · eneral Coun el of the
Immigration and Natu ralization ervice in 1ashn1gton . There
haYe thu far been no addition to the full-time facu lty, but the
part-time in tructors have been reinforced by _ix e.-xcellent appoiJ1t.m ents. Information concerninrr the, e appear ei wher iu
thi i sue. They contain a healthy admixtw-e of experience and
youth.

Faculty From Ten Schools
The preceding paragraph aroused my curiosity as to how we are
doing in the matter of the selection of our faculty from the alumni
of various law schools. Assuming the prerequisite that, in order to be
considered for a position as a law teacher, one must have received his
law training in a first class law school, the interest at William Mitchell
is not whether the prospect comes from one school or another, but
whether he has the fundamental qualifications of sound education, scholarship, character, experience, and the ability to communicate, that are
necessary to make a really competent teacher. Our faculty has been built
on that bas:i . A count now disclose that of the 30 men on our faculty
thi year, eight come f rom '\ illiarn l\litchell, seven from the University
of Minnesota, six from Harvard, two each from the University of Chicago and the Uraiver-it:y of Michigan and one each from the niv rsity
of Louvain. Xorthwestern , Marquette. John l\IarshaTI of Chicago and
Creiahton . Our . tudent are tber fore being il1structcd by men who
recei\'ed their training in 10 d ifferent law chool . 1 is i:ntere ting to
kno," that three of t he men from William .:.Uitchell are top men from
recent classes at the school who ar regarded by our faculty committee
a., prime prospects.

The December trip to the Minnesota State Prison at Stillwater proOn September 12, l969?, 131 men
One of the sad experiences of the year was the sudden and shocking
vided to the students was very successful as was a similar trip held three and two women began their course death of Judge Herbert F. Goodrich. _In spite of intense suffering from a
years ago.
of study at William Mitchell Col- painful hip condition, the judge made tbc long trip from Philadelphia
to St. Paul to appear as commencement speaker at our commencement
Our two sophomore class representatives, Robert Burk and Frank lege of Law.
on
June 12. He and Mrs. Goodrich made many friends here, and his
O'Meara, are planning a report on the possibility of a lecture series this
Some of the statistics of this address was inspiring. Within less than two weeks he passed away, folyear. In the past students have failed to support and hear outstanding
group are as follows: average age, lowing what appeared to have been a successful operation on the ailing
speakers. It is an insult to this school to provide speakers for the stu!i!6; married, 65 per cent; age range, hip. There is no hope of replacing a man like Judge Goodrich. We can
dents and have the students fail to show up. I cannot understand why
only be thankful for his life and his long service to the nation and the
21-47; average number of children,
legal profession: Our school is proud of its association with this truly
students will not give one hour of their time a semester to hear a judge
11/2; number from states outside great man.
or lawyer speak on a topic of interest to all.
:Minnesota, 30 per cent.
Don't forget the Law Wives Annual Dance. It will be held

Educational backgrounds are varied and extensive. Approximately
has always been the social highlight of the school year.
96 per cent hold one or more degrees
A word-of thanks to Mr. William Green and Mr. John Dulebohn. from 36 colleges and universities .
These two respected members of our faculty have never missed a student- Several students have done advancsponsored function.
ed work in European universities.
this year at the Commodore Hotel on Feb. 2, 1963. This dance

Take part in the Student Bar-the dividends you reap will be most
valuable. If you want to work on any of the committees, contact their
chairmen or any officer of the Student Bar. Our meetings are held the
first Tuesday of the month in Room 201. Let your voice be heard, it is
the only way we have in determining what you want.
The most apathetic student is the one who complains the loudest
-Milton Bix
about the way things are run.

Scholarship Fund Grows

A most heartening experience has been the willingness of law firms
and corporations to respond to our very spotty efforts to increase the
chool' chola.r~hip fund. Time bas permitted only a few calls yet the
fund has _increru;ed four-fold ince la t year. The n ed for scholar hipi- great. and we hope to increase our effort . It has been extremely grat ifying to have the \,Villiam l\fitchell Law Wive and the Ramsey County
Occupations include that of ac- Lawyers' Wi es participat in our cholorship program.
countant, business administrator,
A school improvement that has been long anticipated is occurring
law clerk, engineer, insurance adjuster and consultant, tax specialist, this fall. This is the attractive landscaping of the building grounds. It
has been made possible through funds given by our generous friends and
air force officer, teacher, special supporters, the executives of West Publishing Company. They are thus
investigator, physicist, personnel credited with another important step in the improvement of William
Mitchell.
counselor and geologist.
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Controversial Holdings Seen on Freeway Access
By Floyd B. Olson
Almost twenty years before Minnesota became a state, the first American case was decided in which it was recognized that an abutting property owner had private rights in the adjacent streets.' From that time on,
courts have been intermittently confronted by litigation requiring more
precise definitions of those rights when the state or its political subdivisions
have exercised the police power and the power of eminent domain. Since
the advent of the controlled access highway, and more especially since the
development of the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways;
the problem has been one of particular interest to property owners and
practicing attorneys.
Earlier courts believed that all roads were established to service the
adjoining land.3 By 1949 the concept began to change,' allowing the courts
of several states to hold that where no highway previously existed the
construction of an interstate highway gave no right of access to the abutting owner." More recently, South Dakota has followed the trend in
Darnall v. State.•
The Darnalls had commenced inAbout the Author
verse condemnation proceedings
Floyd B. Olson, a senior law
against the State of South Dakota
student at William Mitchell,
and its Highway Commission to rereceived his B.A. degree, cum
cover for a claimed taking of aclaude, from Gustavus Adolcess. They had established a cafe,
phus College. He has been
cabin, and service station business
employed by the Minnesota
on their property, which abutted a
State Legislature, by the Dissingle highway known as U.S. Highway 14 and State Highway 79. Motrict Court of Hennepin Countorists and truckers had direct acty, and the Attorney General's
cess to the establishment. On the
Office, where he has done legal
side of the highway farther from
research for the past two years.
the landowners' property, and adjacent to that highway, a new con- tion of what constitutes a "taking
trolled access interstate highway or damage" under the power of emiwas constructed; and between the nent domain is inextricably woven
new and old highways a concrete into the question of whether a specurb and gutter were built, thereby cific act causing diminution of proppreventing ingress and egress to the erty value is an exercise of the ponew interstate road, except at in- lice power. Both the police power
terchanges about one mile to the and the power of eminent domain
north and south of the subject prop- are essential attributes of sovereignerty. The old highway and the Dar- ty without which social order would
nalls' access to it were not disturbed. be questionable. On the other hand,
The jury believed that the Darnalls constitutional limitations, well known
had sustained damages amounting to judges and lawyers, have been
to $7,000.
placed upon the exercise of these
On appeal, the State Supreme powers for the protection of private
Court reversed and held that there property rights. Some courts have
was no taking of access from the expressly recognized that the dislanrlowners' property; that the con- tinction is one of degree, depending
trolled acc~·,,:-.highway which result- upon the facts of the case, to be deed in a -diversion of traffic from the cided by weighing the private rights
old highway and the circuitous route infring·ed as against the public rights
to get to the property was not a obtained.' The problem "cannot be
taking for which compensation had disposed of by general propositions,"
to be paid. The court reasoned that asserted Mr. Justice Holmes. "One
since there was no physical taking fact for consideration," he thought,
of the landowners' property, or loss "in determining such limits is the
of access from the old road on which extent of the diminution."'
the property abutted, the lack of
Other cases, however, indicate that
direct access to and from the new the courts have searched for geninterstate was not special to the eral propositions, many of which
property owners, but was the result appear to be applied with axiomatic
of a proper exercise of the police accuracy in disregard of a weighing
power to be complied with by the of the interests involved. One writer
public generally.
has suggested that "they are poles on
The fundamental problem in the a spectrum, and beyond the guideDarnall case, as in every case in- lines of reasonableness and suitabilvolving interference with the right ity to the end sought there is no conof access, is to reconcile conflicting stantly ascertainable dividing line
public and private right, (s) 7 and to between them." 10
determine by what power of the state
The police power is generally unthis should be done. Often the ques- derstood to be the power of the
state to impose reasonable restric1 Lexington and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Appletions on private property rights
gate, 8 Dana 289, 33 Am. Dec. 497 (Ky.

I

1839).
2 The
41,000 mile network of federal
roads scheduled for completion by 1972. It
is estimated that in every year after 1972,
over 5,000 persons will be saved who otherwise would have died in traffic accidents.
Prisk, Charles W., Benefits of the Interstate
System, Traffic Engineering, Feb. 1962, Pp.
11-12.
3 3 Stan. L. Rev. 298 (1951).
1 City of Los Angeles v. Geiger, 94 Cal.
App. 2d 348, 210 P. 2d 717 (1949).
0 Smick v. Commonwealth, 268 S.W. 2d
424 (Ky. 1954); State v. Burke, 200 Ore. 211,
265 P. 2d 783 (1954); State v. Clevenger, 365
Mo. 970, 291 S.W. 2d 57 (1956); South
Meadow Realty Corp. v. State, 144 Conn.
289, 130 A. 2d 290 (1957) ; State v. Calkins,
50 Wash. 2d 716, 314 P. 2d 449 (1957); State
v. Ralston, 359 P. 2d 529 (Ore. 1961).
0 108 N.W. 2d 201 (S.D. 1961).
c Smith v. State Highway Commission,
185 Kan. 445, 340 P. 2d 259 (1959).
8 See e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Iowa State Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Ia. 869; 82
N.W. 2d 755 (1957); Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. 445, 346 P. 2d
259 (1959).
"Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Supra,
note 8. at 413.
10 Covey, Frank M. Jr., Roadside Protection Through Access Control, Thesis for Degree of Doctor of Juridical Science, U. of
Wisc., 1960, p. 12.
n Mugler v. State, 123 U.S. 023 (1887);
Graham v. Kingwell, 218 Cal. 658, 24 P. 2d
.as (1933).

12 New York State Thruway Authority v.
Ashley Motor Court, Inc., IO N.Y. 2d 151,
218 N.Y.S. 2d 640 (1961). At page 644 the
court said: ''Even supposing, however, that
the defendants possessed valid and subsisting property rights which the legislation
here in issue abrogated, this would not provide sufficient basis for declaring the statute unconstitutional. In this connection, it
is to be borne in mind that it was the very
construction of the thruway which created
the element of value in the land abutting
the road. Billboards and other advertising
signs are obviously of no use unless there
is a highway to bring the traveler within view
of them. What was taken by the regulation,
therefore was a value in the land which the
thruway itself had added to the land and
of this the defendant cannot be heard to
complain. The police power is 'the least
!imitable of the powers of government and
. .. extends to .all the great public needs'
.... " But see Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 188 Mass. 348, 7 4 N .E. 601
(1905) which held that a municipal regulation forbidding signs within a specific distance from a public park was invalid as an
attempt to take property for a public purpose without compensation.
1• See e.g., Ia. Const., art. I, § 18; Mass.
Const., part I, art. IO; Mich. Const., art.
XII, § I; N.Y. Const., art. I, § 7; Wisc.
Const., art. I, § 13.
14 See .e.g., Cal. Const., art. I, § 14; Colo.
Const., art. II, § 15; Mo. Const., art. II, §§
20 and 21; Tex. Const., art. I, § 17; Wash.
Const., art. I, § 16.
10 S.D. Const., art. VI, § 13.
10 Minn. Const., art. I, § 13.

without incurring liability by regu- which, by common law, would have
lations tending to promote the given a private right of action." 21
health, welfare, safety, morals, and This more restricted view is the one
convenience of the public.11 But the adopted in Darnall. Whether "dammonotony of the principle does not age" occurred was not determined
reveal the new content that chang- by the amount of loss, but by the
ing precedents give to it. Statutes type or kind of loss."'
prohibiting the maintaining of adThe frequent difficulty of detervertising signs within five hundred mining whether the damage is spefeet of the right of way line of an cial engages the controversy as to
existing highway have been upheld whether the state has exercised the
under the police power on the proper power. The question; whether
ground that they are reasonably re- in a denial of access or limited conlated to safety and the preservation trol of access case, is often reduced
12
of natural beauty.
to the kind of damage suffered by
On the other hand, the concept the landowner. Having decided this,
of eminent domain has not remained the courts then g·enerally characterstatic. The federal and many state ize the circumstances as a "taking
constitutions 13 provide that private of access" for which compensation
property cannot be "taken" for pub- must be paid under eminent domain
lie use without paying just compen- provisions, or as a "diversion of trafsation. Since the Illinois amendment fie" 20 or "circuity of travel" 27 which
in 1870, other states," including the property owner must share with
South Dakota 10 and Minnesota,'° the general public under the police
have provided substantially that power.
private property cannot be "taken
Despite the English view that an
or damaged" for public use without abutter has the right to immediate
payment of just compensation. The access from his property to a public
extent to which these differing emi- 1highway;• American courts generally
nent domain provisions affect the have not allowed recovery where the
rights of property owners is not en- property owner was left with inditirely clear. At . least three views rect access to his property after
have been expressed as to whether construction had caused a more cirthe words "or damaged" have ex- cuitous route.2' Thus, in cases intended the rights of property own- volving motels, restaurants, service
ers under constitutional eminent do- stations, and other businesses demain provisions.
pendent upon the motoring public,
First, a superficial reading of the the courts have recognized that
provisions has led some courts to losses of trade might result from
the conclusion that any public use more circuitous routes or diversions
of land which caused ascertainable of traffic. But they have also underdiminution of the market value of stood that the costs of highway deneighboring land, though no prop- velopment might become prohibierty was taken therefrom, consti- tive if they were to :recognize a right
tuted damage in the constitutional to the traffic passing by such estabsense." Most courts, including those lishments.30 The practical question
of South Dakota 18 and Minnesota,'° before the court in the Darnall case,
have considered this definition too as in other controlled access cases,
broad.
is whether the landowner's loss is
SPcond, some conrt>1 h:cive 1Jrlopted one wh;c_li. the benefiting public
the view that if the injuries inflicted should bear, or whether the claim
were actionable at common law they if established as precedent would
would constitute "damage" for pur- impose a burden on the public exposes of eminent domain." At com- ceeding the benefits. If Darnall had
mon law, property is the right of been affirmed, there would be no
any person to possess, use, enjoy, legal reason why every businessman
and dispose of a thing." Thus, any in town should not recover for loss
interference with that right, regard- to his business when an interstate
less of a physical taking, would highway by-passes the town. The
"damage" the property and be com- matter is only one of distance. The
pensable. This interpretation also adoption of the terms "diversion of
has been regarded as too sensitive." traffic" and "circuity of travel" inThird, many courts have adopted dicates the courts' response to the
the reasoning of the Supreme Court problem.
of Illinois in Rigney v. Chicago."
Courts have, in addition, concludPerhaps Mr. Justice Mitchell stated ed that the right of access does not
it most clearly when he said, ". . . include access at all points between
31
that to entitle a party to compen- property and an adjacent hig·hway.
sation he must have sustained spe- Where an existing highway is concial damage with respect to his prop- verted into a controlled access freeerty, different in kind from that sus- way, with a single entry way retained by the public generally, and maining for access, the question is

I

17 See e.g., Omaha Horse Railway Co. v.
Cable Tramway Co., 32 Fed. 727 (1887);
McCandless v. Los Angeles, 214 Cal. 67, 4
P. 2d 139 (1931); Jaynes v. Omaha Street
Ry. Co., 53 Neb. 631, 74 N.W. 67 (1898);
Hanks v. Port Arthur, 121 Tex. 202, ,18 S.W.
2d 944 <1932 ) ·
18 Darnall v. State, 108 N.W. 2d 201 (S.D.
1961).
10 See e.(J., Rochette v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. Co., 32 Minn. 201, 20
N.W. 140 (1884); Guilford v. Minneapolis
and St. Louis Ry. Co., 94 Minn. 109, 102
N.W. 365 (1905); Matthias v. Minneapolis,
St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 125
Minn. 224, 146 N.W. 353 (1914); Locascio
v. Northern Pacific Ry Co., 185 Minn. 281,
24 N.W. 2d (1932).
20 Lambert v. Norfolk, 108 Va. 259, 61
S.E. 776 (1908) ·
211 BL Comm. 138; 2 Austin's Jurisprudence; 3rd Ed., 817, 818.
22 See Rochette case, footnote 19, wherein Mr. Justice Mitchell said: "No law ever
proposed to give indemnity for all losses
occasioned by the construction of railroads
and other public improvements. If it did, it
would extend indefinitely."
23 102 Ill. 64 (1881).
24 Rochette v. Chicago, Milwaukee and
St. Paul Ry. Co., 32 Minn. 201 , 20 N.W. 140
(1884).
2o See also Pennysavers Oil Co. v. State,
334 S.W. 2d 546 (Tex. 1960) where a service
station business was lost completely.
20 41 Diversion of traffic" is the term used
to designate a reduction in tbe volume of
the traffic on the highway fronting the abutter's property which is caused by changes
in the highway system .

,. 2. "Circuity of travel" is the term used to
designate the additional distance which an
abutting owner must travel in his use of the
highways as a result of the highway design.
es Lyon v. The Fishmongers Company, I
A.C. 06 2, 684, 685 (1876).
20 Nick v. State Highway Commission, 13
Wisc. 2d 560, 109 N.W. 2d 71 (1961); Carazella v. State, 269 Wisc. 593, 71 N.W. 2d 276
(1955); Darnall v. State, 108 N.W. 2d 201
(S.D. 1961); Pennysavers Oil Co. v. State,
334 S.W. 2d 546 (Tex. 1960). Contra: People
v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P. 2d 779
09-l3); Hamilton v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, 240 Miss. 895, 128 So. 2d
742 (1961).
30 Darnall v. State, 108 N.W. 2d 201 (S.D.
1961); Pennysavers Oil Co. v. State, 334
S.W. 2d 546 (Tex. 1960).
31 Mccann v. Clarke County, 149 Iowa 13,
127 N.W. IOU (1910); Wenger v. Kelly, 182
Iowa 259, 157 N.W. 206, IO:; N.W. 449
(1917).
32 Smith v. State Highway Commission,
185 Kan. 445, 346 P. 2d 259 (1959).
33 Id.
3<
35

Id.
Id.

36
Howard Johnson of Kingsport, Inc. v.
City of Kingsport, 192 F. Supp. 2ll (E. D.
Tenn.1961).
3, See cases cited, note 5, Supra.
as Jones Beach Boulevard Estate v. Moses,
268 N.Y. 362, 197 N.E. 313 (1935); State v.
Ensley, 164 N.E. 2d 342 (1960).
30 Pennysavers Oil Co. v. State, 334 S.W.
2d 5.16 (Tex. 1960); Nick v. State Highway
Commission, 13 Wisc. 2d 560, 109 N.W. 2d
71 (1961).

whether the regulation of access unreasonably restricts the abutting
owners' rights.32 If it is found to be
an unreasonable restriction on the
abutter's rights, or that the highway commission attempted to acquire rather than regulate a portion
of the owner's access, compensable
damage occurs. 33 Acquisition results
in absolute control of the portion of
access taken and future entrances
may be prohibited along that portion.34 Regulation permits the ,.:()t1rts
to determine whether a denial of
future entry is unreasonable.""
The determination of what is reasonable or unreasonable under the
police power is not confined to the
needs of the landowner. It may extend to the control exercised over
access rights of others who are similarly situated. For example, a motel and restaurant owner alleged
that city officials prevented him
from breaking a curb to allow direct
access to his business on the ground
that the highway was to be a controlled access highway. The allegation also stated that property owners similarly situated had direct access to the same highway. It was
held that the complaint on its face,
"has alleged arbitrary i.n:l discriminatory action on the part -oi tht
city." 38
Other limitations on recovery for
claimed loss of access have been established in cases where there was
no prior access, and in cases where
the property owners have claimed
access to both sides of the travelled
portion of the highway. In the first
type of case, the controlled access
highway severs the owner's land
into two parcels. Courts do not permit recovery for loss of access tc
the new highway on the theory that
no access existed before the taking.37
However, it is arguable that severance damages would be greater because the severance by access control would be greater than it would
if the highway were not access controlled. In the second type of case,
a raised centerline strip is constructed, or a sign prohibiting left turn,
is erected, to prevent motorists from
crossing into the lane of oncoming
traffic. Regulations of this nature
are important to trucking firms and
drive-ins. Yet they are considered a
proper exercise of the police power.'''
The legal problems inherent in
highways designed for denial or control of access are likely to remain
controversial. Contrary to th~
Holmes dictum, the fact alone that
the value on land has -ciin,;,::,i~hed _
seems to have had little weight in
allowing recovery under eminent domain."' In an era of transportation
revolution, a safe and efficient highway system is essential. With th('
changing concepts of highway use,
courts should be frank to admit that
the function of roadways is to facilitate traffic, not to raise local land
values. Darnall has contributed
much to this end.

Party Speakers
1/or Law Wives
By Mrs. Paul Rosenthal

The William Mitchell Law Wives
organization began its fourth year
of operation with a party at the
school on Sept. !26 to welcome all
freshman wives and wives of transfer students.
The first regular me,t.!ng 0£ the.
group was held Oct. 3. A panel discussion on "The Role of a Lawyer's
Wife" was given by Mrs. Douglas
K. Amdahl, whose husband is District Court judge in Minneapolis,
and Mrs. George Scott, wife of the
Hennepin County Attorney.
At the meeting on November 7
Charles R. Coulter, a Minneapolis
attorney, spoke on "Your Liability
for Your Child's Mischief."
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Real Property Forfeiture Rule Weaker
By James Malecki

"Equity abhors forfeitures." This fundamental concept of justice is
one of the most venerable maxims of equity ever to be echoed in this
country or England.1 In countless cases, the courts have not only refused
to enforce forfeitures, but have also strictly construed forfeiture clauses
in contracts against the person in whose favor they operate. Despite this
most formidable wall of law against anything that might even resemble
a forfeiture, since earliest times there has existed a notorious exception to
the prohibition of forfeitures rule. This is the exception that allows the
vendor in an installment contract for the sale of land to retain all installments paid, upon a default by the vendee operating to cancel the contract.
In a recent Wisconsin case, Uihlein Realty Company v. Downtown De_vPb],-.• ient Corporation," this exception was once again affirmed, although
the court in dicta indicated that its days may be numbered by holding
that if vendees could prove unjust enrichment of vendor, they might be
entitled to restitution of payments made prior to default and cancellation.
In the Uihlein case, plaintiff vendor brought an action in the nature
of a strict foreclosure asking the
About the Author
court to set a reasonable time for
payment of the amount due from
James Malecki is a senior
defendant vendee under an installat William Mitchell. After rement land contract, and in default
ceiving his B.A. in Business
of payment, defendants to be barred
Administration from the Uniand foreclosed from all rights and
versity of Minnesota in 1957.
interests in the land. Defendants
he served four years in the
answered that to grant strict foreU. S. Navy. He is presently
closure would result in a forfeiture
a Lieutenant in the U . S.
and unjust enrichment of the plainNaval Reserve and is emtiff, and further counter-claimed for
ployed by the Pillsbury Comrestitution of amounts already paid
pany in Minneapolis as Marunder the contract.
keting Brand Manager.
The_J!lnd involved was a parcel
- ofhigh-value land in downtown Milwaukee, the purchase price of which
was $1,000,000. A down payment of gesting that this theory has been
$100,000 was made when the con- gammg recognition in many juristract was executed, and at the time dictions, including Wisconsin." Howof· the default, installments totaling ever, before any relief can be granted
$338,000 had been paid, making a to the defaulting vendee, he must
total of $448,000 paid on the pur- prove that payments already made
chase price of $1,000,000. The trial under the contract exceed the vencourt determined that plaintiff's loss dor's damages as a result of the
of bargain damages (the difference breach. In the absence of what the
between the contract price and the court calls these "special circummarket value of the land at the stances," the right to redeem within
time of the defendant's breach) were a reasonable time gives a defaulting
approximately $375,000.3 Although vendee all the protection he is enthe trial court's own finding of fact titled to. In the Uihlein case, the
..1v.i\.£ f: h.!!.t -pl!t!.l'!.tif.l' (;
d1:un9.g~s ~r.a?rll? concurring opinion held that "speonly $375,000, it granted a judgment cial circumstances" did not exist
of strict foreclosure and placed the warranting to the defendant vendee
reasonable time for redemption at ten further relief beyond the right of
months. This judgment had the in- redemption. This holding was based
direct effect of forfeiting all of the on the contention that defendant's
defendant's previous payments un- inability to redeem implied that the
der the contract (a sum of $448,- property was not worth as much as
000), in excess of the determined the trial court had determined, or
at least that the value could not be
damages.
On appeal, the majority in a readily converted to money.
l,rusque affirmance reiterated an
The problems touched upon in
earlier statement of the court in the the principal case were aptly decase of Oconto Company v. Bacon.' scribed by Professor Ballentine in
Concerning the right of a vendor to his now famous article on the same
strict foreclosure upon default of subject in the Minnesota Law Rethe vendee:
view, Volume 5 at Page 3~9.
... Parties, sho11ld have some reThe law, while looking with
- gird and respect for the terms of
righteous abhorenee on forfeitheir own contracts and ought to
tures, and washing its hands of
make the terms thereof conform
their enforcement, after the
to their real understanding, and
manner of Pontius Pilate, yet has
not rely wholly or even largely
been reluctant to intervene with
upon a court of equity for protecaffirmative relief or to formulate
tion from their own acts.•
any principle condemning the
Contir,uing, the majority charactervalidity of cut-throat provisions
ized the strict foreclosure as a mere
when their essence involves foraffirmance of the party's contract
feiture. Although the law will not
and not a forefeiture.
assist in the vivisection of the vieTh~ concurring opinion adopted a
tim, it will permit the creditor to
more liberal approach, approving the
keep his pound of flesh if he can
theory that a defaulting vendee has
carve it himself.
an equitable right to a remedy preWhat Professor Ballantine wrote
venting unjust enrichment, and sug- _ __ _ __ _ _ _ __ __ __ _
-

1

1

1 Porn. Eq. Jur. 446.
2 9 Wis. 2d 620, 101 N.W. 2d 775 (1960) .
• Market value of the property was given
three appraisals. Vendor's appraiser-$680,·
000, Vendee's appraiser-$975,000, Vendee's
appraiser-$1,000,000. Court settled on a
value between $875,000 and $900,000.
1 181 Wis. 538, 195 N. W. 412 (1923) .
6 Oconto v. Jlacon, 181 Wis. 588, 195 N.
W .. AJ2. {)_923).
0 Schwartz v. Syver, 264 Wis. 526, 59 N.
W. 2d 480 (1958), and Long Investment Co.
v. O'Donnell. 8 Wis. 2d 291, 88 N. W. 2d 674
(1954) . In the first case, although denying
restitution for failure by the vendee to
prove unjust enrichment, the court did ;,ay
at page 531 of the report, "We think It w ell
to say that we are in accord with the trepd
of m0dern cases which recognize that when
the result of retention of monies paid upon
a contract by a vendee who later repudiates
his obligation is a clear unjust enrichment
of the vendor, the vendor may be required
to return such part of the payments as ex·
ceeds the loss which the vendee's default
has caused him."
1

7 Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of
Contract, 5 Minn. L. Rev. 329 (1905) .
8 147 Minn. 35', 180 N. W. 227 (1920) .
• Saville v. Saville, 1 Peere Wms. 774, 24
Eng. Rep. 596 (1818). Palmer v. Temple, 9
l\.d. & F.. 508 (1839). Howe v. Smith, 27 Ch.
D. 89, C. A. (1884) .
10 This appears to be rather strong language in the face of the widely held proposition that damages awarded in action fo1,
breach of contract are to be compensatory
and not punitive.
11 1 A. C. 275 (1916).
""27 Ch. D. 89 , C. A. (1884).
13 That is, a contract containing a forfeiture clause and making time of the essence.
u Henry Uihlein Realty Co. v. Downtown
Development Corp., 9 Wis. 2d 620, 101 N. W .
2d 775 (1960),
15 For a discussion of some of the reasons
which make financing by installment contract desirable and often times necessary,
see Minnesota Land Contract Law in A ction, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 92, 104 (1940) .
1 • For an example of a fairly typical land

in 19~1 still remains a fairly accurate description of the state of modern law on land contracts. By the
great weight of American authority,
no relief can be afforded against
express conditions of a contract for
the sale of land which inflict forfeitures upon defaulting vendee,
even though the default may be
slight, and the payments already
made under the contract, or improvements made to the land are
substantial! An example of the
lengths to which the terms of land
contracts are enforced by some
courts, despite extremely inequitable
results, may be found in Nelson
Realty Company v. Seaman." There
the court denied all relief against
forfeiture even though the vendee
had been killed in France during
the war, and his administrator introduced well grounded ·evidence that
payments already made under the
contract greatly exceeded the vendor's damages.
Most of the American law on
contracts for the sale of land
evolved primarily from three English decisions.• In examining the reasoning of these decisions supporting
what appears to be a forfeiture, we
find the courts generally treating
part payments under land contracts
as security for the performance of
the contract, to be forfeited in the
event of a default by the vendee.
Extending this theory further, some
English courts have even held that
the loss of vendee's payments (in
excess of vendor's provable damages) is a punishment of the vendee for his breach.10
Of course, the law here is equally
as full of inconsistencies as it is
elsewhere. In the face of what appears to be the well established English rule described above, a much
more liberal rule respecting the forf Pit11r<' nf r,i,yments was handed
down by the English Court in Steedman v . Drinkle. 11 There the court
stated that the purchase money paid
in installments should only be regarded as security for the true
amount of the damages suffered by
the vendor due to the vendee's
breach, and therefore all payments
in excess of these "true" damages
should be returned to the vendee
in the event of a non-willful breach
on his part. The court further observed that if the rule established
in Howe v. Smith " (one of the
keystone cases) were carried to its
logical conclusion, the penalty for
breach would become more and
more severe as the vendee moved
closer to completion of his obligations under the contract-a most
illogical and inequitable result.
Two distinct lines of cases dealing with the rights of defaulting
vendees under an installment land
contract of the usual form 13 have
developed in this country. The first
line of cases following the English
"strict" rule holds that where there
has been a default, the vendor may
declare a forfeiture, not only recontract form provided by statute in Minnesota see, Minn. Stat. Sec. 559.21.
17 Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of
Contract, 5 Minn. L. Rev. 329 at 346 (1905) .
1 • See Lytle v. Scottish American Mortgage Co., 122 Ga. 458, 50 S. E. 402, (1905 ) .
for a comprehensive outline of the theories
upon which various courts have refused restitution of payments already made under
an installment land contract, when vendee
is in default.
19 Ibid. 18.
20 Ibid. 18.
21 Ibid. 18.
22 Ibid. 18.
23 38 L.R.A. (N. S.) 899, discusses statutes
aimed primarily at preventing forfeiture
when most of the purchase price has already been paid.
2, This analogy is amplified and criticized at 2 Wis. L. Rev. 307 (1902) .
26 See e.g. Kreuscher v. Roth, 152 Minn.
320, 324, 188 N. W. 996, 997 (1922) and
Nolan v. Greely, 150 Minn. 441, 442, 185 N.
w. 647, 648 (1921) .
20 Under the usual statute a defaulting
vendee's rights in the property can be terminated in thirty days or less in a swift and
Inexpensive action. Where no statute ls In-

taining all that the vendee has paid,
but also regaining possession. The
second and more liberal line has
granted varying relief to the defaulting vendee, depending on the equities of the particular case. Holdings
included in the second line have
been based on any one of three or
four legal theories. In addition to
the case law, several states have
enacted statutes in an attempt to
regulate the rights of parties to
land contracts.
Undoubtedly, the majority American rule, as it now stands, embraces
the strict rule. However, the sentiments expressed by courts in the
liberal minority are gaining a slow
but sure foothold on the American
scene, as is amply demonstrated in
the concurring opinion of the Uihlen case." It is not inconceivable
that the majority rule might some
day be displaced by a combination
of statute and case law based on
the equitable principles contained
in the present day minority viewpoint. The need for such a change
is well illustrated by the following
hypothetical.
Suppose one has contracted for
the purchase of a house or farm.
Not being able to pay the entire
sale price in cash, the purchaser is
required to enter into some type of
credit transaction with his vendor.
A purchase money mortgage may be
given, but often the mode of financing chosen is the installment land
contract (contract for deed) .1• This
agreement will normally provide
that no conveyance is to be made
until all the installments are paid.
The ordinary installment land contract 10 also usually provides that
all payments must be made on the
day that they fall due, and on failure to pay any installment when
due, all obligations of the vendor
shall be at an end, and all previous
payments forfeited as liquidated
damages. Let us now suppose that
the purchaser entered into possession of the land under the agreement, has been in possession for
many years, and has made considerable improvements. In the years
which have passed, the purchaser
has paid, in installments, almost
90% of the balance due on the original purchase price. On the appointed day for payment of the last
installment, our purchaser through
forgetfulness or by mere accident
fails to make the payment due. He
is ready and willing to pay a week
or even a day later, but he has admittedly missed payment on the
day agreed upon. Under the majority American rule, this purchaser
may, as Professor Ballantine puts
it, " . . . be doomed to see the
whole of his estate, the reward of
years of toil and effort, entirely
swept away from him in a moment
by the unbending rule of la,w as to
forfeiture." 17
On what theory or theories have
the courts following the majority
view based their oft-times seemingly
harsh decisions? The following have
been advanced to justify decisions
volved, the vendor's remedy may be even
more efficient, depending on the terms of
his contract. Compare this to the usual
mortgage foreclosure proceedings wherein
the mortgagor has a statutory period of up
to a year after the foreclosure sale in which
to redeem.
27 Most notably in the middle western
United States, Iowa, Nebraska, Minnesota,
a nd Wisconsin. In Wisconsin the rule has
developed through Judicial decision, while
in Minnesota It has evolved through construction of a statute (Minn. Stat. Sec.
559.21) .
28
83 Harv. L. Rev. 883 (1920) .
20 Henry Uihlein Realty Co. v. Downtown
Development Corp. 9 Wis. 2d 775, 101 N.
W. 2d 775, (1960) .
30 Oconto Co. v . Bacon 181 Wis. 538, 195
N. W. 412, 40 A. L. R. 175 (1923).
311 Porn. Eq. Jur. 446.
,. 4 Colum. L. Rev. 423 (1908) .

imposing forfeitures of installments,
payments or valuable improvements
in excess of the vendor's actual damages.'"
I. Where a vendee makes default, he cannot take advantage
of his own wrong.1•
2. To allow restitution raises the
implication that the vendee has
a reserved right to rescind, a
right that may or may not be
exercised by vendee depending
on what is happening to the market value of the land."°
3. Not to enforce a stipulation
for forfeiture in the land contract would amount to interference with the right of the parties
to freely contract. :n
4. Retention of payments already
made is in the nature of liquidated damagee.21

In addition, even those courts
which have adopted the liberal view
in the adjudication of defaulting
vendee's claims, admit that there
are certain grounds upon which restitution will be denied to the vendee.
Generally the following situations,
if found to exist, will operate to
deny the vendee's claim:
l, Where vendor bas not cancelled or rescinded the contract
and stands ready to perform,
2. Where the vendor's damages
are equal to or greater than the
payments retained by him after
cancellation.
3. Where the express provision
for liquidated damages is genuine and does not amount to a
penalty or forfeiture.

Looking beyond the specific reasons upon which the courts have
based their so-called "forfeiture"
rulings, one finds inherent in the
general pattern of these decisions a
reflection of the social and economic
attitudes of the country during the
periods when the stfr ·i rule found
its widest application. Each decision re-affirming the sacredness of
an individual's contract made at
arm's length seems to echo the tradition of rugged Yankee individualism in a society and economy for
the most part free from governmental and court imposed restrictions. Thus, as the country moved
away from the traditional doctrine
of laissez faire it is only natural that
the courts should reflect in their
decisions this basic change in the
nation's philosophy and attitude towards the government's role in a
free and democratic society. As a
small part of this fundamental
change in outlook, we find an increasing reluctance on the part of
the courts to enforce by judicial
decree provisions of installment land
contracts, which if enforced, will
work forfeitures. Strengthening the
case law, several states have enacted legislation of one sort or another attempting to provide relief
to the hapless vendee caught in
the grips of an iron clad contract.23
The success of these statutes has,
as will be seen later, not been too
spectacular.
In examining the development of
the liberal rule, one basic fact can( Continued on page 6)

35
California pvi! Code, Sec. 3275,
"Whenever by the terms of an obligation,
a party thereto incurs a forfeiture, or a loss
in the nature of a forfeiture, by reason of
his failure to comply with its provisions, he
may be relieved therefrom upon making
full compensation to the other party, except in a case of a grossly negligent, willful, or fraudulent breach of duty."
80 Minn. Stat. Sec. 559.21, "When a default is made In the conditions of any contract for the conveyance of real estate or
any interest therein, whereby the vendor
has a right to terminate same, he may do
so by serving upon the purchaser, his personal representative or assigns, either within or without the state, a notice specifying
the conditions in which the default has been
made, and stating that such contract will
terminate thirty days after the service of
such notice unless prior thereto the purchaser shall comply with such conditions
.. 1 Alta. 344, (1908) .
and pay the costs of service . . . If within
04 Statutes in Minnesota, North Dakota,
the time mentioned the person served comSouth Dakota, Nebraska, California and plies with such conditions, and pays the cost
Maryland are representative.
of service and attorneys' fees a s provided
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l(NOW YOUR TRUSTEES

John B. Burl~e
Leads Busy Life
)Ir. John B. Burke, a member of
our Board of Trustees, was born
in McGregor, Iowa, April 21, 1901 ,
the son of James J. and Mildred
(Goedert) Burke.
He married Margaret Barrett, of
Hastings, Minn., on May 17, 1925.
They have five children : Mary
(Mrs. John Stryker), Geraldine

Mitchell's
Grandson
Forms Firm
Bradshaw Mintener and William
Mitchell, grandson of the namesake
of William Mitchell College of Law,
have announced the formation of
a partnership for the general practice of Law in Washington, D .C. ,
on Sept. 15, 1962.
Mr. Mitchell is the son of William D. Mitchell, former Attorney
General of the United States under
President Hoover. He was a partner
in Doherty, Rumble, Butler, Sullivan and Mitchell, St. P an], from
1937 to 1953; General Counsel of
the United States Atomic Energy
Commission from 1953 to 1957, and
more recently special counsel to
Jones, Day, Cockley and Reavis,
Washington , D.C.
Mr. Mintener was formerly General Counsel of the Pillsbury Co .
from 1946 to 1954, Assistant Secretary of the Department of Health ,
Education and Welfare of the United States from 1954 to 1956, and
more recently counsel to Powell ,
Dorsey and Blum, Washington, D .C .

(Mrs. Howard Boyer), Patricia
(Mrs. Warren Kump) , John B. Jr.
and Margaret (Sister Jeanne Charlotte of the Order of the Visitation
nuns). The Burkes have 15 grandchildren.
Mr. Burke was educated in the
parochial schools of Iowa and Minnesota . In 1922 he graduated cum
laude from St. Paul College of Law,
where he was a member of Phi Beta
Gamma.
A former faculty member of St.
Paul College of Law, Mr. Burke
taught a course entitled Mortgages
now known as Security Transactions.
From 1922 to
1924, Mr. Burke was
a title attorney for
the Federal Land
Bank of St. Paul. In
1924 he became chief
John B. Surke counsel for Minnesota Federal Savings and Loan Association, a position he still holds.

AXO::S'Y:'lO :

Repriuted by permission of Hastin

olleg of the Law

Under the editorship of Mr. William B. Danforth, the William
Mitchell faculty members are currently preparing summaries of recent Minnesota Supreme Court decisions . Beginning in September,
1962, these summaries appear in the
"Bench and Bar," the official
monthly publication of the Minnesota State Bar Association.
This project is the result of a
suggestion, by Mr. Ronald P. Smith,
Project Chairman of the State Bar's
Legal Publications Committee, that
the faculties of the two law schools
in Minnesota contribute articles to
the "Bench and Bar." In discussions with William Mitchell representatives it was decided that the
case summaries would be the special project of the William Mitchell
faculty.
Mr. Danforth, Professor of Law
and Assistant Dean at William
Mitchell, is presently doing the
preparation work as well as the t'diting, until a definite format of presentation can be established.

In 1924 he became a partner in the law firm of Scott
and Burke, in 1936 a partner
of Scott, Burke and Scott, and
in 1962 he was joined by his
son, John B. Burke, Jr,. in the
firm Burke, Scott and Burke.

Mr. Burke is a member of the
American Bar Association, a past
president of the Minnesota State
Bar Association, a past president of
the Ramsey County Bar Association, and a past treasurer of the
Minnesota Tuberculosis and Health
Association. He is an active member on the Board of Governors of
the Minnesota State Bar Association.

Practice, Two ·Teaching
Jobs Keep Forsberg Busy
of writing briefs and making
The course in Criminal Law is unoral argwnents, Besides his
dertaken by law students at William
teaching duties, Mr. Forsberg
Mitchell during their first year of
is engaged in law practice, asstudies. It is taught by David C .
sociated with the firm of
Forsberg, who is not only engaged
Briggs and Morgan in St. Paul.
in private practice, but also has a
second teaching position on the facThe decision to study law was
culty of the University of Minne- not made by Mr. Forsberg until he
sota Law School.
had completed his undergraduate
"I've always had a desire to do work and was serving in the Army.
He had attended
some teaching," says Mr. Forsberg.
the University of
He has been fulfilling th;s
Minnesota, graddesire at William Mitchell and
uating with a B.A.
is also teaching a course at the
in international reUniversity law school in appellations in 1953 .
late advocacy, which consists
While in the service,
from 1953 to 1955,
he became interested in the study of
David C. Forsberg
law through some
contact with court martial proceedThe Sixth Annual Dinner of the
ings. Therefore, in 1955, Mr. Forsberg
William Mitchell College of Law
enrolled in law school at the UniverAlumni
Association
was
held
sity of Minnesota, graduating with
Wednesday, June 13, in the Star of
honors in 1958. H e was in the top
the North Room of the Raddisson
IO per cent of his graduating class,
Hotel.
and in the Order of the Coif. He also
Officers were elected for the asso- wrote for the Minnesota Law R eciation at the dinner. The Honor- view as recent case editor.
able Ronald E. Hachey was elected
At the law firm , he works in the
president, William H. D e Parcq, litigation department, preparing
vice-president, the Honorable Don- cases for trial. Although only a small
ald T . Barbeau, secretary, and H arpart of his practice consists of crimir y L. Holtz, treasurer.
nal work, he indicates a keen interThe classes of 1912 and 1937 were est in this field, perhaps partially
honored at the dinner.
stimulated by his t eaching at the
The Alumni Association voted to school.
participate in fund-raising for the
Mr. Forsberg was born and raised
school at the dinner .
in this area, and makes his present
Members of the Alumni Banquet home with his wife and four chilCommittee were the Honorable dren outside of St. Paul in WashDouglas K . Amdahl, chairman; Da- ington County, Woodbury Townvid E. Mikkelson, Gabriel D. Gian- ship. He is a member of the Ramsey
cola, John B. Keefe and George County, Minnesota and American
Bar Associations.
Scott.

Alumni Officers
Named at Dinner

T..IBTIXG law chool i Jike getting married; eyeryone has
ome advice on how to make a go of it. ro matter how
good the advice i though, there is nothing that will replace
trying thing out for your eU. B efor:e th fir t w ~k ha
ended in hopele s confusion a :first-year law -tudent will
have heard fift~- different study technique . even i1 be taJk 5
to no one, walk in tl1e sh.adow , and ·wear· a disgui e.
The a.dvi er who bas the la. t word on bow to stay in bw
school will star t. by saying "the most important thing to remembe1·' or "the only thing to do is" aud tl1en go on to ay,
'' bri f e,~ery ca e.'' 'never: touch a CaJl.lled brief or outline, ''am1otate," ··J.\Jake su=arie of e· ch -ection of cla,~
notes. ' "attend all l cture.,' '' em.inar b"ut with moderation,
(no bull e 'oru;)
practice writing old exams." "be organized" "keep physically fit. morally traight," and n and
on. ad nauseam.
Throughout lh. maze of advic , one doe not have to be
overly bright to catch one little thread of con istency: it's
a four-letter word that wear you out, "work.' urpri-ingly
enough, even though one must do h,i own work it' qu ite
njoyable to most. and I venture a guess to all that come
back for the econd Tound. The advice on advice offered
be.r ·pells -w ork: li ten up . ior tbat' the m't word on how
lo -tay in Jaw -chool. dclitional advice may be obtained
from other fust-yfilr tudent .

Solomon lsenstein

Norton L. Armour

Alonzo B. Seran

Charlton Dietz

Charles L. Langer

Marvin J. Green

Mitchell Welcomes Instructors
* * NEW
* ASSIGNMENTS
* * *
TWO GET
By Gary Phleger

ester College and an LL.B . from
William Mitchell. For the past five
years Mr. Dietz has worked in the
legal department of Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing. He will assist Dr . Van der Borght m the
course on Antitrust Law.
Mr. Charles L. Langer is the
most recent graduate to join the
faculty, since he received his LL.B .
from William Mitchell last June.
Mr. Langer received a B .B.A. from
the University of Minnesota, and

Two members of the present William Mitchell faculty will have new
teaching assignments this coming
semester. Mr. William J. Erickson
will be teaching the course in Conflict of Laws and Mr. Roger W.
Schnobrich will instruct the course
in Trusts.
William Mitchell will welcome
several new faculty members this
fall and coming semester.
Mr. Solomon l senstein will be
teaching the course in Administrative Law the second semester. A
graduate of Harvard University
with both an A.B. and LL.B. Mr.
lsenstein will divide his duties between teaching and work for the
Immigration and Naturalization
Service. He has been an attorney in
that service for t wenty years and
John F. Dulebohn, who is curwas recently transferred to St. Paul rently teaching the course in Torts
as regional counsel.
at William Mitchell, had experiThe course in Taxation of
ence in teaching while attending the
Estates is being taught by Mr.
law school at the University of
Norton L. Armour, who has
Minnesota as a student. He explains
served for the past five years
that as a student at the university,
in the office of the regional
where he received his LL.B ., he
counsel of the Internal Revtaught school at Augsburg College
enue Service in Boston. Mr.
Prep School to earn his way through
Armour is currently associated
law school.
with the firm of Bundlie, KelA graduate of Gettysburg College
ley and Torrison in St. Paul,
with a B.A. degree, Mr. Dulebohn
and received a B.B.A., M.B.A.
was persuaded to come to Minneand LL.B from the University
sota by a former college friend who
of Michigan and an LL.M. in
lived in this area.
taxation from Boston Univer-

is assisting in the instruction m the
course in Legal Research.
Another recent graduate of William Mitchell appointed to the faculty is Mr. Marvin J. Green, who
received his B.A. from the University of Minnesota and his LL.B .
from William Mitchell, ranking
number one in his class. Mr. Green
is associated with the firm of Meier,
Kennedy and Quinn in St. Paul and
will teach the course in Business
Associations this coming semester.

Teaching Isn't New
for Prof. Dulehohn

sity.

Mr. Alonzo B. Seran will teach
the course in Personal Property for
the second semester. Mr. Seran received a B.B .A. from the University
of Minnesota and an LL.B. from
William Mitchell, where he graduated in 1959 ranking number one in
his class. Mr. Seran is associated
with the Minneapolis firm of Farnand, Lee, Mastor and Hart, as well
as serving as chairman of the Junior Bar Section of the Hennepin
County Bar Association.
Joining the staff in the second
semester will be Charlton Dietz,
who received a B.A. from Macal-

Upon graduating from law
school, he was in private practice for about a year when, as
Mr. Dulebohn explains, "I
wanted to see France." He enlisted in the army and served
in France, during which time
he also attended the University
of Nancy, France, and obtained a Diploma in Civil Law.

After returning to private practice in Minneapolis in 1920, Mr.
Dulebohn met Dorothy Brown and
was married . Shortly thereafter, he
took a position in the legal department of the Minneapolis Street
Railway Co. In this work, Mr. Dule-

bohn handled cases in the l\1unicipal and District courts and argued
appeals before the
Supreme Court of
Minnesota. Although he did not
keep accurate records of statistics,
Mr. Dulebohn estimated he had trie~
over 1,800 cases for
John F. Dulebohn this company and
argued about 18
cases before the Minnesota Supreme
Court. In 1947, he was appointed
general counsel for the transportation company and served in this
capacity until 1952.
Thoughts again turned to teaching for Mr. Dulebohn in 1954,
when he accepted a position teaching at the Minneapolis-Minnesota
Colllege of Law and later at the
William Mitchell College of Law. He
has taught a variety of courses at
the law school, including Agency,
Equity, Evidence, Legal Research
and Torts. Says Mr. Dulebohn, "If
a student applies himself to the program we have here (at William
Mitchell) he will be a well-rounded
individual in the practice of law."
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ty Attorney's Office. Mikkelson, Fort Lauderdale, engagfog m the
during his years of study at the law general practice of law.
school, was assistant registrar and in
1961
that position had much to do with
Kenneth
J.
Maas
Jr., is associated
buyer, assistant to the sales manager, the organization of our school in its
sales manager and finally to mem- present quarters on Summit Ave.
with the firm of Firestone, Fink,
ber of the board of directors. He
Krawetz, Miley & O'Neill, St. Paul.
1959
was also made president of a subDouglas Heidenreich, who ranked
Kenneth D . Siegfried is now a first in his graduating class, is with
sidiary company in 1956.
partner in the firm of Schroeder & the firm of Erickson, Popham, Haik
1942
Siegfried, Minneapolis, and is conJohn C. Chommie, B.S.L., LL.B., tinuing in the practice of patent and & Schnobrich, Minneapolis.
LL.M., J.S.D., professor of law at trademark law .
the University of Miami, has writ1960
ten a review of a book titled "Taxa1962
tion of Foreign Income" by Bittker
John A. Thabes, who was adComplete information is
and Ebb. This review appears in 14 mitted to the Minnesota Bar in
not available from the 1962
Stanford Law Review 626 .
May 1960, was also admitted to
Alumni. The results from the
practice in Florida in June 1961. H e
1958
recent survey will be pubDavid Mikkelson, formerly en- is now living in Fort Lauderdale,
lished
in the spring edition
gaged in private practice in Minne- Fla., and is associated with the firm
of
the
Opinion.
of
Saunders,
Curtis,
Ginestra
&
apolis, is now an attorney in the
civil division of the Hennepin Coun- Gore, Atlantic Federal Building,

Alulllni Briefs
ByR. W. Rahn

DEAR ALUMNI: We've had
excellent response from the recent grads. But how about
some of you earlier grads? We
at the school and your fellow
alumni
across
the
nation
would be interested in knowing what YOU are doing these
days. So why not drop a card
or a short note, care of the
ALUMNI EDITOR, and fill us
in?

At the time this goes to press, we
have an interesting situation involving two of our alumni-Judge Douglas K. Amdahl, Class of 19,51 , and
Judge Donald T . Barbeau, Class of
1943. Both men, judges on the municipal bench in Minneapolis, would
like to succeed the late Judge Harold N. Rogers, who passed away on
Oct. 31 of this year. Judge Rogers
was on the District Bench for the
4th Judicial District, which you will
recall is the Hennepin County District Court. Judge Amdahl was appointed by Minnesota's Gov . Andersen to fill this vacancy, under a constitutional provision for the filling of
such vacancies for the unexpired
term. Judge Barbeau, however, was
elected on the Nov. 6 ballot to this
same position, under a statutory
provision providing for the filling of
such vacancies at the next election.
As the matter now stands, our two
alumni will probably have recourse
to the Minnesota Supreme Court in
a "friendly suit" to determine who
should get the judgeship.

1922
Geoffrey P. Mahoney, senior
member of the law firm of lVIahoney
and Mahoney, Minneapolis, passed
away on June 24 after suffering a
stroke. A native of Ireland, he had
practiced law in Minneapolis since
J922. He was active in the International Association of Insurance
Counsel, Knights of Columbus,
American Legion and local athletic
clubs, as well as the county, state
and national bar associations.
1926
Hon. James T . Harrison. chief
justice of the Supreme Court of
:Montana, gave the commencement
address, entitled "The Responsibilities of Citizenship," at the June
commencement of the :Montana
School of Mines at Butte, Mont .
-Chief Justice Harrison was awarded
the degree of doctor of laws, honoris
causa, by the school during the commencement exercises.
1930
George R. Bohrer has been president of Farwell, Ozmun, Kirk & Co.
since 1958. He came to St. Paul in
1925 and started with F.O.K. & Co.
as an order clerk. He attended law
school out of a desire to have more
than a high school education, and
since those days, although he has
never practiced law, he has 'risen in
his company through the positions
of clerk in the buying department,

00& l "ON l!W.lad
1

·uu!w 1nnd IU!DS
a I Wd
aiaw.1sod
··6.10 IYO.ld•UON

·s·n

Hon. Goodrich,
'62 Speaker,
Dies in June
Many of those who attended the
commencement exercises last June
12 were saddened to learn that the
Hon. Herbert F. Goodrich, who delivered the commencement address
and received an honorary degree of
doctor of laws from the William
Mitchell Board of Trustees, passed
away two weeks later.
After participating in the graduation ceremonies, Judge Goodrich, on
the following day, flew back to his
home in Philadelphia, Pa., where he
underwent a serious operation. Unfortunately, complications developed
and on June 25, he died.

Real Property Forfeiture Rule Weaker
(Continued from page 4)
not be overlooked. A defaulting vendee in seeking restitution of payments, is rarely in as strong a position to ask for affirmative relief, as
is the vendor, who is usually ready,
willing, and able to perform his part
of the bargain. Courts have thus
often found it difficult to afford any
sort of affirmative relief to the vendee, especially if there is the slightest trace of willfulness or negligence
in his breach. However, when the
vendee's breach is the result of ignorance, surprise, fraud, accident or
mistake, he has been given relief,
e,·en in those courts which adhere
to the strict rule. Carrying this liberality one step further, some courts
hold that the reason for default is
immaterial, if it is not willful, and
therefore the victim of an economic
depression, who despite all human
efforts and best intentions is unable to pay, should not be put at
the mercy of a vendor armed with
a contract giving him the power to
work a forfeiture.
An entirely different tack has
been adopted by one group of courts
following the liberal minority rule.
These courts in refusing to enforce
forfeiture clauses in installment land
contracts do so by drawing an analogy between the vendor and vendee under an installment land contract and the relationship of a mortgagor and mortgagee, especially
when the vendee is in possession.24
The similarities between the relationships are quite striking, leading
the courts on more than one occasion to state that the legal relationship of vendor and purchaser under
an installment land contract is substantially that of a mortgagee and
mortgagor."' The only substantial
difference between the two situations -appears to be one of remedies.
Upon default in a lien theory state,
the vendor has a "quicker" remedy
than his counterpart, the mortgagee:• Because of this dissimilarity
in remedies, it is only logical that
the vendee, if given a choice, would
prefer the mortgage method of fi-
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nancing his purchase. Unfortunately,
financial limitations usually prevent
the vendee from exercising this
choice. He is forced to trade the
protection inherent in a mortgage
for the low down payment inducements of the installment land contract. Viewed in this light the position of some courts in creating a
fictional mortgagee/mortgagor relationship to prevent forfeiture under
a breached installment land contract
does not seem altogether unreasonable. Once having determined that
a mortgage situation does exist, the
courts then apply the old equitable
maxim, "Once a mortgage, always
a mortgage," and promptly declare
any forfeiture provisions in the contract void as clogs on the mortgagor's (vendee's) right of redemption.
Not in all jurisdictions has the
mortgage analogy been used to benefit the defaulting vendee. In a few
states"' it has been used as doubleedged sword- against the vendee,
purporting to aid him, but in actuality leaving him worse off than he
would have been if left to his substantive rights under ordinary contract law. This rather surprising result is obtained by first implying
the existence of a mortgagee/mortgagor relationship, and then granting vendor a remedy of strict foreclosure against the defaulting vendee. The vendee is said to be protected because in so doing he is
granted a period of redemption (usually thirty days or less) which he
would not be entitled to if left to
his contractual rights. The practical
effect, however, is to bar all relief
for the vendee upon the expiration
of the period of redemption, including any equitable remedy which he
might have had if the transaction
had been handled as an ordinary
contract cancellation. Despite well
reasoned criticism from reputable
authority,28 this rule still persists, as
it did in the Uihlein case,"" with the
courts that follow it holding that
the cases have nothing to do with
forfeiture or relief from forfeiture
because the vendee, by the terms of
his contract, has failed to bring himself within the field of equitable
relief.30
Practically, a court need not create a legal fiction such as the mort~
gagor / mortgagee relationship to
grant a defaulting vendee relief
from forfeiture. Many courts do
not. All that is really needed is a
recognition of one of the equity
court's roost basic functions, the
power to relieve from forfeiture and
penalty."'
The law carefully limits the remedies that a party to a contract may
provide for by way of liquidated
damages. If these provisions are in
any way unreasonable, they will
quickly be struck down. Often an
express condition precedent in a
land contract, such as the stipulation which makes time of the essence, is as penal in nature as an

unreasonable liquidated damages
stipulation. There is a growing tendency for courts of law and equity
to disregard both the form and
effect of these express conditions
when they are harsh, penal, and
provide for a penalty or forfeiture.••
The Canadian provinces provide
many good examples of this changing attitude on the part of the
courts towards defaulting vendee's
rights under an installment land
contract. In practically all Canadian
cases, strict foreclosure will not be
allowed .to destroy a vendee's interest in the land if a forfeiture will
result. A typical example of the
courts' attitude towards a vendor's
claim against his defaulting vendee
when the claim if enforced by strict
foreclosure would result in an uncontroverted, unjust enrichment of
the vendor, is contained in the following excerpt from the opinion in
Canadian Pacific v . Meadows.83
"I think the court ought 'in every
case to consider the interest of
all parties who may be affected
by its judgment, and if it can
do so without injustice to the
Plaintiff vendor, it has the power
and ought to exercise it to refuse
a form of relief to which the
Plaintiff vendor is pri.ma facie
entitled and give him another
form of relief to which he is
also entitled, if by so doing the
interests of the other parties will
thereby be better conserved."

Goaded by the economic and social evils of past depressions legislatures in many states have passed
statutes conferring upon courts the
power to adopt a more liberal approach by relieving a vendee from
the harsh provisions of a land contract when the enforcement of those
provisions would work a forfeiture."'
Unfortunately the statutes to a large
extent have been disregarded or
rendered impotent by judicial interpretation. In some cases, they have
even been construed against the vendee, the very person whom the
legislature intended to protect. Generally, these statutes may be grouped into two broad classifications:
Those statutes which expressly prohibit the enforcement of any contract stipulation which will work a
forfeiture, the California statute
being a typical example; 85 and those
which attempt to modify the harsh
effect of "time is of the essence"
clauses and other conditions precedent in installment land contracts
by prescribing a statutory period of
time within which the defaulting
vendee may make good his obligations under the contract without
having it cancelled. The Minnesota
statute is typical of this group.38
A California case illustrates the
relative ineffectiveness of these statutes in the protection of vendee's
rights against forfeiture under installment land contracts. The case
was decided soon after passage of

the California statute, and completely disregarded it. The court
held that when there has been a
default, the vendor may declare a
forfeiture, retaining all that vendee
has paid, and also regaining possession of the Iand.37 This view has
been maintained consistently in
California,36 and only recently in
but a relatively few cases has the
position of the defaulting vendee
been strengthened ...
-Statutes in the second classification
have also, in most cases, been effectively gutted by judicial construction of any substantial protection which the legislatures might
have intended for the defaulting
vendee thereunder. These statutes
have typically been held to create
a remedy of strict foreclosure for
the vendor,' 0 making tender and
prayer for specific performance by
vendee after expiration of the statutory period of redemption ineffective." Courts applying this type
of statute disregard, in most cases,
the extent of the vendor's damages
as a result of the breach. As Professor Ballantine states, "statutes
which were designed to afford relief
against forfeitures have instead become smoothly working devices most
favorable and convenient to the
vendor, while depriving the vendee
of the possible gracious exercise of
discretion on the part of the court
when equity should demand it.'.'"
A conclusion of sorts can be
drawn, based on the Uihlein case
and other recent cases similar to it.
Despite the almost insurmountable
barrier of stare decisis, a slow trend
appears to be developing that gives
the defaulting vendee under an installment land contract limited relief
from the sometimes disastrous effects of his own acts. Hopefully, in
those states not hindered by restrictive legislation, this trend will
eventually culminate in the prohibition of all forfeitures under land
contracts, resulting in unjust enrichment to the vendor. In states such
as Minnesota, where statutes have
been interpreted to allow forfeiture,
positive action on the part of the
legislature will be needed to correct
the situation.48
herein, the contract shall be therebv reinstated; but otherwise shall terminate:"
123 Cal. 1, 55 Pac. 718, 43 L. R. A. 199,
69 Am. St. Rep. 17, (1898).
38 For recent cases following the Glock
view, see: Gattian v. Coleman 86 Cal. App.
(2d) 266, 194 P . 2d 728, (194,8), and Wilson
v. Security First Nat. Bank, 84 Cal. App.
(2d) 427, 190 P. 2d 975 (1948).
39 Barkls v. Scott, 34 A. C. 153, 208 P.
(2d) 367, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 704 (1949).
• 0 International Realty Co. v. Vanderpoel. 127 Minn. 89, 148 N. W. 895 (1914),
and Olson v. N. P. Ry. Co. 126 Minn. 299,
148 N. W. 647 (1914).
"Clarkv. Dye, 158 Minn. 217,197, N. W.
202 (1924). •
"5 Minn. L. Rev. 351 (1921).
43 For an interesting discussion of the
possible economic effects (primarily an increase ih the size of down payment requirements in land contracts) which might result
from statutory reduction of vendor' s rights
in the event of a default by vendee see
Minnesota Land Contract Law in Action, 39
Minn. L. ReY. 92 (1940).
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